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Abstract
We provide here a general mathematical framework to model attitudes towards ambiguity which uses the
formalism of quantum theory as a “purely mathematical formalism, detached from any physical inter-
pretation”. We show that the quantum-theoretic framework enables modelling of the Ellsberg paradox,
but it also successfully applies to more concrete human decision-making (DM) tests involving financial,
managerial and medical decisions. In particular, we elaborate a mathematical representation of vari-
ous empirical studies which reveal that attitudes of managers towards uncertainty shift from ambiguity
seeking to ambiguity aversion, and viceversa, thus exhibiting hope effects and fear effects. The present
framework provides a promising direction towards the development of a unified theory of decisions in
the presence of uncertainty.
Keywords: Quantum structures; Decision theory; Ellsberg paradox; Uncertainty; Hope and fear effects.
1 Introduction
Notwithstanding the remarkable success of expected utility theory (EUT), a number of fundamental prob-
lems need to be solved before a single theory is unanimously accepted to represent human decision-making
(DM) under uncertainty.
A first issue is specifying what one means by “uncertainty”. Following Knight [1], two kinds of un-
certainty are possibly present: objective uncertainty, or risk, designates situations where probabilities are
known or knowable, i.e. can be estimated from past data or calculated by means of mathematical rules. By
contrast, subjective uncertainty, or ambiguity, designates situations where probabilities are neither known,
nor can they be objectively derived, calculated or estimated [2].
The predominant model of DM under risk was elaborated by von Neumann and Morgenstern [3], who
identified the axioms allowing to uniquely represent human preferences over lotteries by maximization of the
expected utility (EU) functional. On the one side, however, decision puzzles like the Allais paradox reveal
that some of these axioms are violated in concrete choices [4]. And, on the other side, this formulation does
not account for ambiguity, which is prevalent in social science and likely influences social science decisions.
The Bayesian paradigm tries to fill this gap introducing the notion of subjective probability: when the
probabilities are not known, people may still form their own beliefs, or priors, which generally vary from
one person to another. People then update their beliefs according to the Bayes rule of standard probability
theory, i.e. the one axiomatized by Kolmogorov (Kolmogorovian probability) [5].
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In 1950s, Savage extended von Neumann-Morgenstern EUT in agreement with the Bayesian paradigm,
presenting a set of axioms which, once satisfied, “compel” decision-makers to behave as if they had a
single Kolmogorovian probability with respect to which they maximize EU [6]. Savage’s formulation,
also known as subjective EUT, provides the foundations of “rational behaviour”, that is, subjective EUT
prescribes how people should behave in the presence of uncertainty, and it has been widely used in decision
theory, economics and finance, because of its mathematical simplicity and predictive success. In addition,
subjective EUT can be empirically tested.
Regarding the latter, Ellsberg showed in two simple thought experiments, the two-urn example and the
three-colour example, that decision-makers do not always maximize EU but, rather, they prefer risky acts
over ambiguous acts, a behaviour known as ambiguity aversion [7]. Ellsberg preferences particularly violate
the famous sure thing principle, one of the building blocks of Savage’s axiomatization, and they have been
empirically confirmed several times (see, e.g., the reviews in [8] and [9]). These well-documented violations
of EUT have led many scholars to elaborate alternative DM models, which even include representation of
beliefs by more general structures than a single Kolmogorovian probability measure (see, e.g., the reviews
in [8], [9] and [10]).
Things are not cleared out if one considers more concrete DM tests, in which financial, managerial,
medical, etc., decisions are taken in the presence of uncertainty. In these cases, indeed, different attitudes
towards ambiguity, e.g., ambiguity seeking, arise in addition to the ambiguity aversion revealed by Ellsberg
preferences. To realize the possibility of attitude reversal, consider the following example.
Suppose your doctor tells you that there is a certain probability that you have a serious disease. You
then look for alternative opinions. Some doctors estimate that the probability is much lower than the one
originally estimated, while others estimate that the probability is much higher. Which option would you
“prefer” – the former which is risky, or the latter which is ambiguous? Intuition suggests that the degree
of probability will play a fundamental role in the final decision. In fact, if the probability is low, then it is
reasonable to assume that a fear effect occurs and you prefer the risky option, thus showing an ambiguity
aversion behaviour. On the other side, if the probability is high, then it is reasonable to assume that a hope
effect occurs and you instead prefer the ambiguous option, thus showing an ambiguity seeking behaviour
[11].
A comparison between a risky and an ambiguous option, like the one presented in the two-urn example,
was part of two experimental studies on managers, one on DM under environmental uncertainty performed
by Viscusi and Chesson [11], and the other on investment decisions under performance uncertainty by Ho,
Keller and Keltyka [12]. In both cases, a shift from hope to fear effects, and viceversa, was observed which
is incompatible with a theory of rational preferences.
The present study fits an emergent research programme which applies the mathematical formalism of
quantum theory to model complex cognitive phenomena, including categorization, decision, judgement,
language and perception, where classical Bayesian, or Kolmogorovian, modelling techniques are problem-
atical (see, e.g., [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]). This research has recently been extended to economics and finance
(see, e.g., [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]). In particular, we have recently worked out a theoretical framework to
represent individuals’ preferences and choices under uncertainty (risk, ambiguity) that uses the formalism
of quantum theory as a “pure mathematical formalism consisting in non-distributive probability measures
and linear vector spaces over complex numbers”. Indeed, this quantum mathematics in Hilbert spaces has
some advantages in modelling the information uncertainty that is induced by a non-controllable context,
like a cognitive one [26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. It must be noted, in this regard, that the present theoreti-
cal framework also accords with other attempts to represent human decisions in Hilbert space (see, e.g.,
[32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38]).
A new theoretical element of the present quantum-theoretic framework is the introduction of the state
of the conceptual entity under investigation (DM entity), which has a conceptual, rather than a physical,
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nature and can change under the interaction with the decision-maker [39]. The notion of conceptual state,
its representation and connections with subjective probabilities through quantum probability, provide the
theoretical tools that enable capturing ambiguity and individual attitudes towards ambiguity as context-
induced state changes. The quantum-theoretic framework has been applied to the Ellsberg paradox and
recent variants, as recognised by some of the proponents (see, e.g., [40], p. 3836). In this approach,
subjective probabilities are represented by quantum probabilities, rather than classical Kolmogorovian
probabilities – structurally, quantum probability is more general than Kolmogorovian probability, as the
latter rests on a distributive algebra, while the former does not [28].
In the present paper, we extend our previous findings, showing that the quantum-theoretic framework
enables modelling of the Ellsberg two-urn example, also providing a faithful mathematical representation
of data collected on a two-urn DM test performed by one the authors, together with other authors [29].
This enables us to reproduce the ambiguity aversion pattern observed in the data. However, the quantum-
theoretic framework can also incorporate different attitudes towards ambiguity, including ambiguity seeking
behaviour, as well as shifts from one attitude to another. And, indeed, we show here that hope and fear
effects in investment choices can be naturally incorporated into the quantum modelling of a DM scenario
where a risky option is opposed to an ambiguous option, like in the DM tests in [11] and [12].
The results above support a systematic application of quantum structures in economics and the devel-
opment of a unitary quantum-based theory of DM under uncertainty.
For the sake of completeness, we summarize the content of this paper in the following.
In Sec. 2, we present the essential mathematics that is needed to introduce subjective EUT (Sec. 2.1),
together with the Ellsberg paradox in the two-urn example (Sec. 2.2) and analyse the empirical study of
Ho, Keller and Keltyka [12] on attitudes reversal in the presence of ambiguity (Sec. 2.3). We then review in
Sec. 3 the quantum-theoretic framework that uses the mathematics of Hilbert space, whose essentials are
summarized in Appendix A. Successively, we apply in Sec. 4 the quantum-theoretic framework, model the
two-urn example (Sec. 4.1) and represent data collected in the two-urn experiment performed by ourselves
and revealing an ambiguity aversion pattern (4.2). Finally, we elaborate in Sec. 5 a mathematical model in
Hilbert space which accounts for the shifts between ambiguity aversion and ambiguity seeking behaviour
in either direction. This allows us to represent hope and fear effects within a single theoretical framework.
The mathematical framework works in both investment gain (Sec. 5.1) and loss (Sec. 5.2) scenarios of the
empirical study in [12], whose data are also represented here (Sec. 5.3). Final comments in Sec. 6 conclude
the paper.
2 Expected utility, paradoxes, ambiguity and its effects
We present in the following sections the essential definitions and results within subjective EUT, together
with the Ellsberg paradox and some DM tests revealing individuals’ behaviour in the presence of uncer-
tainty. The reader who is interested to deepen these results can refer to [6], [9], [10].
The starting point which we will assume in the following is that human preferences are revealed by the
decisions of individual agents (or, decision-makers).
2.1 Basic mathematical framework of subjective expected utility theory
The first axiomatization of DM under uncertainty was formulated by von Neumann and Morgenstern, who
presented a set of axioms allowing to uniquely represent human decisions by means of the maximization of
the EU functional with respect to a single Kolmogorovian probability measure [3].
A major limitation of von Neumann-Morgenstern’s formulation is that it only deals with the uncertainty
that can be formalized by known probabilities (objective uncertainty, or risk). On the other hand, situations
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frequently occur where uncertainty cannot be formalized by known probabilities (subjective uncertainty,
or ambiguity) [1]. As mentioned in Sec. 1, a Bayesian approach would introduce the notion of subjective
probability, thus minimizing the distinction between objective and subjective uncertainty. In a Bayesian
approach, if probabilities are not known, people anyway form their own beliefs (or priors), which may
differ across individuals but are still formalized by Kolmogorovian probabilities [2]. As a matter of fact,
Savage presented an axiomatic formulation of subjective EUT which extends von Neumann-Morgenstern’s
in agreement with a Bayesian approach [6].
To present the mathematics of subjective EUT, we preliminarily introduce the following symbols.
Let S be the set of all physical states of nature and let P(S ) be the power set of S , that is, the set
of all subsets of S . Let A ⊆ P(S ) be a σ-algebra. An element E ∈ A denotes an event in the usual
sense. Let p : A ⊆P(S ) −→ [0, 1] be a Kolmogorovian probability measure over A , that is, a normalized
countably additive measure satisfying the axioms of Kolmogorov [5].
Then, let X be the set of all consequences, and let the function f : S −→ X denote an act. We
denote the set of all acts by F . Moreover, let % denote a weak preference relation, that is, a relation over
the Cartesian product F ×F which is complete and transitive. We adopt the usual interpretation of 
and ∼ as strong preference and indifference relations, respectively, namely, if a person strongly, or strictly,
prefers act f to act g, we write f  g; analogously, if a person is indifferent between f and g, we write
f ∼ g.
Next, let < be the real line and u : X −→ < be a utility function, which we assume to be a strictly
increasing and continuous function, as it is usual in the literature.
Let us now introduce some simplifying assumptions, which however do not affect our conclusions in this
and the following sections. Firstly, we suppose that the set S is discrete and finite. Secondly, we suppose
that an element x ∈X denotes a monetary payoff, so that X ⊆ <.
Let E1, E2, . . . , En denote mutually exclusive and exhaustive elementary events, which thus form a
partition of S . If xi is the utility associated by the act f to the event Ei, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then f can be
equivalently represented by the 2n-tuple f = (E1, x1; . . . ;En, xn), which is interpreted in the usual way as
“we get the payoff x1 if the event E1 occurs, the payoff x2 if the event E2 occurs, . . . , the payoff xn if the
event En occurs.
We finally define the EU functionalW (f) =
∑n
i=1 p(Ei)u(xi) associated with the act f = (E1, x1; . . . ;En, xn)
with respect to the Kolmogorovian probability measure p.
Representation theorem. If the algebraic structure (F ,%) satisfies the axioms of ordinal event inde-
pendence, comparative probability, non-degeneracy, small event continuity, dominance and the sure thing
principle, then, for every f, g ∈ F , a unique Kolmogorovian probability measure p : A ⊆P(S ) −→ [0, 1]
and a unique (up to positive affine transformations) utility function u : X −→ < exist such that f is
preferred to g. In symbols, f % g if and only if the EU of f is greater than the EU of g, i.e. W (f) ≥W (g).
For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the utility value u(xi) depends on the individual’s attitudes towards risk, while
p(Ei) is interpreted as a subjective probability, expressing the individual’s belief that the event Ei occurs
[6].
Savage’s representation theorem is at the same time compelling at a normative level and testable at a
descriptive level. Indeed, regarding the former, if the axioms are intuitively reasonable and decision-makers
agree with them, then they must all behave as if they maximized EU with respect to a single probability
measure satisfying Kolmogorov’s axioms; furthermore, regarding the latter, the axioms suggest to per-
form concrete DM tests to confirm/disprove the general validity of subjective EUT, hence of the axioms
themselves. This is why Savage’s EU formulation is typically accepted to prescribe “how rational agents
should behave in the presence of uncertainty” providing, in this way, the decision-theoretic foundation of
the Bayesian paradigm. However, on the one side, the theory offers very little about where beliefs come
from and how they should be calculated while, on the other side, DM tests, performed since the 1960s,
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Urn I Urn II
Acts ER: red ball EB: black
ball
ER: red ball EB: black
ball
pR ∈ [0, 1] pB = 1− pR pR = 1/2 pB = 1/2
f1 $100 $0
f2 $100 $0
f3 $0 $100
f4 $0 $100
Table 1. Representation of events, payoffs and acts in the Ellsberg two-urn example.
have systematically found deviations from that rational behaviour in concrete situations. This will be the
content of Secs. 2.2 and 2.3.
2.2 The Ellsberg paradox
In 1961, Daniel Ellsberg presented various thought experiments in which he suggested that decision-makers
would prefer acts with known (or objective) probabilities over acts with unknown (or subjective) probabil-
ities, regardless of EU maximization. In other words, they would prefer probabilized to non-probabilized
uncertainty [7]. Ellsberg did not perform the experiments himself, but two of these have meanwhile became
famous, namely, the three-color example and the two-urn example.
We discuss here the two-urn example, because it is the paradigmatic example that is used in more
concrete DM tests on ambiguity and ambiguity attitudes.
Consider two urns, urn I with 100 balls that are either red or black in unknown proportion, and urn II
exactly with 50 red balls and 50 black balls. One ball is to be drawn at random from each urn. Then, free
of charge, a person is asked to bet on pairs of the acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 in Table 1.
We denote the event “a red ball is drawn” and “a black ball is drawn” by ER and EB, respectively. Then,
we observe that f2 and f4 are unambiguous acts, because they are associated with events over known
probabilities, 0.5 in this case, whereas f1 and f3 are ambiguous acts, because they are associated with
events over unknown probabilities, ranging from 0 to 1 in this case. This distinction led Ellsberg to suggest
that, while decision-makers will be generally indifferent between acts f1 and f3 and between acts f2 and
f4, they will instead generally prefer f2 over f1 and f4 over f3, a behaviour called ambiguity aversion by
Ellsberg [7].
The predictions of subjective EUT are incompatible with the Ellsberg preferences f2  f1 and f4  f3,
hence behaviour of a decision-maker who is psychologically influenced by ambiguity cannot be reproduced
by subjective EUT. Indeed, maximization of EU entails consistency of preferences, that is, f2  f1 if
and only if f3  f4. To show this, suppose that decision-makers assign subjective probabilities pR and
pB = 1− pR to the events ER and EB, respectively. Then, an EU maximizer will prefer f2 over f1 if and
only if W (f2) > W (f1), which is equivalent to the condition (pR − 12)(u(100)− u(0)) < 0, where u(0) and
u(100) denote the utilities associated with the payoffs 0 and 100, respectively. On the contrary, the same
EU maximizer will prefer f4 over f3 if and only if W (f4) > W (f3), which is equivalent to the condition
(pR − 12)(u(100) − u(0)) > 0. These conditions cannot be simultaneously satisfied, which entails that one
cannot find a single Kolmogorovian probability measure p such that f2  f1 and f4  f3 by maximization
of the EU functional with respect to p, whence the Ellsberg paradox.
Decision tests on Ellsberg urns have been performed since 1960s and they generally confirm Ellsberg
preferences against subjective EUT, hence an ambiguity aversion attitude of decision-makers (see, e.g., [9]
for a review of experimental studies).
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Figure 1. A sample of the questionnaire on the two-urn example. It corresponds to the choice between
acts f1 and f2 in Table 1.
We have recently performed a whole set of DM tests, including the two-urn example, to check the
quantum-theoretic framework introduced in Sec. 1. In [29], we presented a sample of 200 participants with
a questionnaire in which they had to choose between the pairs of acts “f1 versus f2” and “f3 versus f4” in
Table 1. Respondents were provided with a paper similar to the one in Figure 1.1 In the two-urn test, 26
participants chose acts f1 and f3, 10 chose f1 and f4, 6 chose f2 and f3, and 158 chose f2 and f4. Hence,
overall 164 respondents over 200 preferred act f2 over act f1, for a preference rate of 164/200=0.82 (the
difference is significant, p = 1.49E − 24). Moreover, 168 respondents over 200 preferred act f4 over act
f3, for a preference rate of 168/200=0.84 (the difference is again significant, p = 1.25E − 28). Finally, 16
respondents over 200 preferred either f1 and f4 or f2 and f3, for an inversion rate of 184/200=0.92. This
pattern accords with Ellsberg preferences and straightly points towards ambiguity aversion, thus confirming
existing results in empirical literature.
The Ellsberg paradox and other Ellsberg-type puzzles put at stake both the descriptive and normative
foundations of subjective EUT, which led various scholars to propose alternatives to subjective EUT, in
which more general, including non-Kolmogorovian, mathematical structures are used to represent subjective
uncertainty. Major non-EU models include Choquet EU, cumulative prospect theory, maxmin EU, alpha
maxmin EU, smooth preferences, variational preferences, etc. (see, e.g., the reviews in [9] and [10]).
However, Mark Machina elaborated in 2009 two variants of Ellsberg examples, the 50/51 example
and the reflection example, which challenge major non-EU models in a similar way as Ellsberg examples
challenge subjective EUT [41, 42]. Machina preferences have been confirmed in two tests against the
predictions of both subjective EUT and its non-EU generalizations [29, 43]. The implication of Ellsberg
and Machina paradoxes is that a unified theoretic approach to represent human preferences and choices
1For the sake of simplicity, we assumed that each choice concerned two alternatives, hence indifference between acts was
not a possible option.
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under uncertainty is still an unachieved goal [43].
2.3 Empirical studies on ambiguity attitudes
We have seen in Sec. 2.2 that, in each pair of acts of the two-urn example, people are asked to choose
between a risky option, that is, an option with known probability of getting a given consequence, and an
ambiguous option, that is, an option with unknown probability, but belonging to a given range, of getting
the same consequence. This is exactly the experimental setting that is designed to test individual attitudes
towards ambiguity in more concrete DM situations, involving medical, managerial and financial decisions.
Tests in scenarios different from urns have revealed different attitudes towards ambiguity, namely,
ambiguity neutral and ambiguity seeking, in addition to the ambiguity aversion identified in the two-urn
example (see, e.g., [8], [9] for a review of these studies). In these cases, attitudes towards ambiguity depend
on:
(i) likelihood of uncertain events;
(ii) domain of the consequences;
(iii) source that generates ambiguity [45].
We review some of these studies in the present section. To this end, we preliminarily introduce two
notions which express the success or failure of a financial operation, as follows. A gain is realized when
the result of an operation made by the decision-maker is above expectations. A loss is realized when the
result of an operation made by the decision-maker is below expectations.
For example, previous empirical studies on financial decisions in the presence of uncertainty consisted
in asking participants to compare a risky option with a given probability p¯ to realize a gain (respectively, a
loss), with an ambiguous option with a probability to realize a gain (respectively, a loss) ranging between
p¯ −∆ and p¯ + ∆ (see, e.g., [8, 9, 11]). The authors found that in general (i) plays a fundamental role in
determining ambiguity attitudes. Indeed, if the probability of a gain is high, then a fear effect occurs in
which people tend to be ambiguity averse. But, as the probability of a gain decreases, people tend to be
less ambiguity averse, reaching a crossover point in which they become ambiguity seeking, which indicates
a shift from a fear to a hope effect. Viceversa, if the probability of a loss is high, then a hope effect occurs
in which people tend to be ambiguity seeking. But, as the probability of a loss decreases, people tend to be
less ambiguity seeking, reaching a crossover point in which they become ambiguity averse, which indicates
a shift from a hope to a fear effect.
This empirical pattern was confirmed at high probabilities by a test performed by Ho, Keller and Keltyka
[12] on 40 MBA students. Managers are typically provided with a target, or a benchmark, to measure their
performance. Thus, a management decision corresponds to a gain (loss) if it leads to a higher (lower)
outcome than the benchmark. The authors considered two experiments in a “within subjects design”, as
follows.
ROI experiment. In this experiment, the return on investment (ROI) had a benchmark of 16%. In the
loss scenario, participants had to compare a risky option with a probability of a loss equal to 60%, with
an ambiguous option with a probability of a loss ranging between 40% and 80%. In the gain scenario,
participants had instead to compare a risky option with a probability of a gain equal to 63%, with an
ambiguous option with a probability of a gain ranging between 42% and 84%.
In the ROI experiment, the authors found that, in the loss scenario, 59% of the participants preferred
the ambiguous option, thus revealing an ambiguity seeking attitude, hence the presence of a hope effect
(41% preferred instead the risky option). On the contrary, in the gain scenario, 66% of the participants
preferred the risky option, thus revealing an ambiguity averse attitude, hence the presence of a fear effect.
These findings agree with those in previous studies (see, e.g., [8, 9, 11]).
IRR experiment. In this experiment, the internal rate of return (IRR) had a benchmark of 15%. In
the loss scenario, participants had to compare a risky option with a probability of a loss equal to 65%,
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with an ambiguous option with a probability of a loss ranging between 45% and 85%. In the gain scenario,
participants had instead to compare a risky option with a probability of a gain equal to 68%, with an
ambiguous option with a probability of a gain ranging between 47% and 89%.
In the IRR experiment, the authors found that, in the loss scenario, 65% of the participants preferred
the ambiguous option, thus revealing an ambiguity seeking attitude, hence the presence of a hope effect
(35% preferred instead the risky option). On the contrary, in the gain scenario, 62% of the participants
preferred the risky option, thus revealing an ambiguity averse attitude, hence the presence of a fear effect.
These findings are consistent with those in the ROI experiment and agree with the patterns in previous
studies (see, e.g., [8, 9, 11]).
Additional experiments were performed in [12] in which other sources of uncertainty, as outcome am-
biguity, were investigated. However, we will not deal with these additional experiments here, for the sake
of brevity.
3 A quantum-theoretic framework for human decisions
We present in this section the essentials of the general quantum-theoretic framework we have recently
elaborated to model human decisions, which proposes a unitary solution to the puzzles in Secs. 2.2 and
2.3 [26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31].
The quantum-theoretic framework needs (some of) the mathematics of Hilbert space, hence, before
proceeding further, it is worth to explain why we believe that this mathematical framework is well suited
to represent the entities, states, context-induced state changes and subjective probabilities involved in a
DM process.
The use of a Hilbert space formalism is suggested by the analogy existing between the description of
an experiment in quantum physics and the description of a cognitive, e.g., DM, test. This analogy was
discussed in detail in [39], but we present the salient points of it in the following.
An experiment on a quantum entity is typically performed in a laboratory, i.e. a space-temporal domain.
The quantum entity preliminarily undergoes a preparation procedure designed by the experimenter, at the
end of which “the entity is in a specific state”. This state expresses the “physical reality” of the quantum
entity, in the sense that, as a consequence of being in that state, the entity has some “actual” properties
independently of any measurement that can be performed on it (realistic part). When a measurement
is performed on the quantum entity, the macroscopic apparatus acts as a measurement context which
interacts, on a physical level, with the entity and changes its state in a way that is generally neither
controllable nor predictable (operational part). Then, the quantum entity, its states, contexts, properties,
and the mutual statistical relations are canonically represented in the Hilbert space formalism.
A similar realistic-operational description can be provided of a DM test [39]. A DM test is typically
performed in a “laboratory”, i.e. a room or space-temporal domain. Suppose, for example, that a DM test
is performed in which a sample of participants have to pick their choices from a list on a questionnaire.
The information contained in the questionnaire and the meaning content of the situation that is the object
of the decision (literally what is written in the questionnaire and which has to be decided on) define a
preparation procedure for a conceptual DM entity ΩDM , at the end of which we can say that “ΩDM is in a
defined state pv”. Thus, a preparation procedure is literally something which does take place when a DM
test is performed and each participant “is confronted with this one and unique state”, independently of
any belief the participant has about it, because the state was prepared by the experimenter designing the
test, long before and independent of any individual participating in the test. This state has a conceptual,
rather than a physical, nature, but is a “state of affairs”, because it expresses the meaning content of the
questionnaire that was prepared by the experimenter. As such, it is not a mental state or a state of belief.
In addition, this state is independent of any operation that can be performed on ΩDM , hence it expresses
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the “conceptual reality” of the entity at a given time. Having a conceptual nature, this state must be
distinguished from a physical state of nature (see Sec. 2.1).2 The state of ΩDM can change under the effect
of a context, which has a cognitive nature. Indeed, when the DM test is performed and a participant is
asked to make a choice, the individual acts as a context which interacts, on a cognitive level, with ΩDM
and changes its state in a way that is generally neither controllable nor predictable. More precisely, when
participant number 1 enters the room and fills out the questionnaire, the participant “interacts with this
conceptual state presented to her/him in the test”, but prepared, e.g., on a paper, by the experimenter, and
changes this state. When participant number 2 enters the laboratory, the participant again interacts with
this independently prepared conceptual state and contextually changes it, etc. We will see that it is this
potentiality of the state to change under a context that allows the state to capture aspects of ambiguity and
ambiguity aversion. Indeed, ambiguity aversion or ambiguity seeking states are states that are contextually
changed in the course of the DM test.
The realistic-operational description above suggests representing canonically conceptual entities, states,
contexts, properties and mutual statistical relations in the Hilbert space formalism of quantum theory.
Indeed, the Hilbert space formalism proves that this dynamics of contextual change can be modelled in
specific cases, and we believe that it can be successfully applied to all other types of DM tests.
It is important to note that the above description of a DM process differs from that of other quantum-
based approaches to DM, where the state corresponds to a mental state of the decision-maker, which can
change under the influence of an external context (see, e.g., [14, 17]). While the latter description is
frequently used, we think that it is closer to a quantum Bayesianism interpretation of the Hilbert space
formalism of quantum theory (see, e.g., [44]) and, additionally, does not completely capture the elements
involved in a DM process, preparation, contextual interaction, state change. This is why we prefer to
adopt the description of the DM process presented here, as we think that it more completely describes the
dynamics of a DM process. In addition, it more closely adheres to the interpretation of the Hilbert space
formalism expounded in modern manuals of quantum theory.
We also notice that the notion of “state of a DM entity” introduces a new element, not directly related
to beliefs and not previously used in cognitive science, at the best of our knowledge. The notion is mainly
borrowed from physics, as a test in cognitive science, like an experiment in physics, is a bridge between a
preparation and a measurement. We believe, that the notion of state should be a constitutive element of
any theory statistically connecting entities, contexts, experiments and dynamics.
Coming now to the specific DM situations presented in Sec. 2, let ΣDM be the set of all states of ΩDM
and let E be the set of all events which may occur. For every pv ∈ ΣDM , let µ(E, pv) be the (subjective)
probability that E occurs when ΩDM is in the state pv.
Then, let E1, E2, . . . , En ∈ E denote mutually exclusive and exhaustive elementary events, let X ⊆ <
be the set of all consequences (assumed to denote monetary payoffs), and let, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the
act f map the elementary event Ei ∈ E into the payoff xi ∈ <, so that f = (E1, x1; . . . ;En, xn). Finally,
let u :X −→ < be a continuous strictly increasing utility function expressing individual attitudes towards
risk.
We use the canonical Hilbert space notation and representation reviewed in Appendix A, and associate
ΩDM with a Hilbert space H over the field C of complex numbers. The number n of mutually exclusive
and exhaustive elementary events entails that H can be chosen to be isomorphic to the Hilbert space Cn
of all n-tuples of complex numbers. Let {|e1〉, |e2〉, . . . , |en〉} be the canonical orthonormal (ON) basis of
Cn, where |e1〉 = (1, 0, . . . 0), |e2〉 = (0, 1, . . .), . . . , |en〉 = (0, 0, . . . , 1).
A state pv ∈ ΣDM of ΩDM is represented by a unit vector |v〉 ∈ Cn, 〈v|v〉 = 1.
An event E ∈ E is represented by an orthogonal projection operator Pˆ over Cn. The set L (Cn) of all
2The notions of “conceptual entity” and “conceptual state” will be specified in the applications to concrete examples, e.g.,
the Ellsberg two-urn example (Sec. 4.1).
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orthogonal projection operators over Cn has a non-distributive lattice structure, unlike a Boolean algebra.
It follows from the above quantum representation of events that, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the elementary
event Ei is represented by the 1-dimensional orthogonal projection operator Pˆi = |ei〉〈ei|.
For every state pv ∈ ΣDM of ΩDM , represented by the unit vector |v〉 =
∑n
i=1〈αi|v〉|ei〉 ∈ Cn, the
function
µv : Pˆ ∈ L (Cn) 7−→ µv(Pˆ ) = 〈v|Pˆ |v〉 ∈ [0, 1] (1)
induced by the Born rule, is a quantum probability measure over L (Cn). In particular, we identify µv(Pˆ )
with the (subjective) probability µ(E, pv) that the event E, represented by the orthogonal projection
operator Pˆ , occurs when ΩDM is in the state pv. Thus, in particular, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
µ(Ei, pv) = 〈v|Pˆi|v〉 = |〈ei|v〉|2 (2)
Let us now represent acts by using the quantum mathematical formalism. The act f = (E1, x1; . . . ;En, xn)
is represented by the hermitian operator
Fˆ =
n∑
i=1
u(xi)Pˆi =
n∑
i=1
u(xi)|ei〉〈ei| (3)
Then, we introduce, for every pv ∈ ΣDM , the functional “EU in the state pv” Wv : F −→ <, as follows.
For every f ∈ F ,
Wv(f) = 〈v|Fˆ |v〉 = 〈v|
( n∑
i=1
u(xi)Pˆi
)
|v〉
=
n∑
i=1
u(xi)〈v|Pˆi|v〉 =
n∑
i=1
u(xi)|〈ei|v〉|2 =
n∑
i=1
µ(Ei, pv)u(xi) (4)
where we have used (2) and (3). Equation (4) generalizes the usual EU formula of Sec. 2.1.
We observe that the EU generally depends on the state pv of the DM entity ΩDM . When Wv(f) does
(not) explicitly depend on the state pv, then the act f is (un)ambiguous, in the sense specified in Sec.
2.2. This agrees with the insight above that the state pv mathematically and conceptually incorporates
the presence of ambiguity.
Let us now come to the description of the DM process. The state of the DM entity can change under
the effect of a context, which has a cognitive nature, as we have seen above. An example of such a
context-dependence is given by an interaction with the decision-maker. Indeed, suppose that, when the
decision-maker is presented with a questionnaire involving a choice between the acts f and g, the DM entity
ΩDM is in the initial state pv0 . As the decision-maker starts comparing f and g and before a decision is
made, this mental activity can be described as a context interacting with ΩDM and changing pv0 into a
new state. The type of state change depends on the decision-maker’s attitude towards ambiguity. More
specifically, a given attitude towards ambiguity, say ambiguity aversion, will determine a given change of
state of the DM entity to a state pv, inducing the decision-maker to prefer, say f . But, a different attitude
towards ambiguity, say ambiguity seeking, will determine a different change of state of the DM entity to a
state pw, leading the decision-maker to instead prefer g. In this way, different attitudes towards ambiguity
are formalized by different changes of state of the DM entity hence, through (2), by different (subjective)
probability measures.
In symbols, for every f, g ∈ F , states pv, pw ∈ ΣDM may exist such that Wv(f) > Wv(g), whereas
Ww(f) < Ww(g), depending on decision-makers’ attitudes towards ambiguity. This suggests introducing a
state-dependent preference relation %v on the set of acts F , as follows. For every f, g ∈ F and pv ∈ ΣDM ,
f %v g if and only if Wv(f) ≥Wv(g).
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We have recently proved that a context-induced state change may explain the inversion of preferences
observed in the Ellsberg and Machina paradox situations, which can be both modelled in the quantum-
theoretic framework [27]. In addition, we have provided a quantum representation of various DM tests,
including the three-color example [26, 29, 31], the 50/51 example [26, 29] and the reflection example [28, 29].
The results above are important, in our opinion, because the quantum-theoretic framework provides a
unitary solution to several paradoxes and pitfalls of rational decision theory. Furthermore, it allows us to
draw the following conciliatory result.
According to subjective EUT, decision makers should maximize EU with respect to a single Kolmogoro-
vian probability measure. The quantum-theoretic framework above shows that decision makers actually
maximize EU with respect to a non-Kolmogorovian, namely quantum, probability measure.
Regarding the two-urn example in Sec. 2.2, the quantum-theoretic framework can be applied too, as
we have proved in [30]. However, due to its paradigmatic character to represent ambiguity attitudes, we
want to dedicate a separate section to the modelling.
4 A quantum model for ambiguity aversion effects
In this section, we particularize the quantum-theoretic framework in Sec. 3 to the two-urn example, proving
that it enables representation of the empirical data in Sec. 2.2 and that it enables modelling of hope and
fear effects in management decision tests.
4.1 Quantum representation of the two-urn example
The two-urn example defines two conceptual entities, DM entity ΩIDM which is the urn with 100 red or
black balls in unknown proportion, and DM entity ΩIIDM which is the urn with 50 red balls and 50 black
balls.
Let ER and EB denote the exhaustive and mutually exclusive elementary events “a red ball is drawn”
and “a black ball is drawn”, respectively. Both ΩIDM and Ω
II
DM are thus associated with a 2-dimensional
complex Hilbert space, which we choose to be C2. Let |e1〉 = (1, 0) and |e2〉 = (0, 1) be the unit vectors
of the canonical ON basis of C2. The elementary events ER and EB are represented by the projection
operators PˆR = |e1〉〈e1| and PˆB = |e2〉〈e2| = 1− PˆR, projecting onto the 1-dimensional subspace generated
by |e1〉 and |e2〉, respectively.
Laplacian indifference considerations on physical urns suggest that the initial state pv0 of both Ω
I
DM
and ΩIIDM , before any interaction with a cognitive context, is represented by the unit vector
|v0〉 = 1√
2
|e1〉+ 1√
2
|e2〉 = 1√
2
(1, 1) (5)
in the ON basis {|e1〉, |e2〉}, A generic state pv of both ΩIDM and ΩIIDM is instead represented by the unit
vector
|v〉 = ρReiθR |e1〉+ ρBeiθB |e2〉 = (ρReiθR , ρBeiθB ) (6)
where ρR, ρB ≥ 0, ρ2R + ρ2B = 1, and θR, θB ∈ <.
For every i ∈ {R,B}, the (subjective) probability µ(Ei, pv) of drawing a ball of color i in the state pv
of either ΩIDM or Ω
II
DM is then, using (1) and (2), given by
µ(Ei, pv) = 〈v|Pˆi|v〉 = |〈ei|v〉|2 = ρ2i (7)
11
Let us now consider the quantum representation of acts. For given utility values u(0) and u(100), the
acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 in Table 1, Sec. 2.2, are respectively represented by the hermitian operators
Fˆ1 = u(100)PˆR + u(0)PˆB (8)
Fˆ2 = u(100)PˆR + u(0)PˆB (9)
Fˆ3 = u(0)PˆR + u(100)PˆB (10)
Fˆ4 = u(0)PˆR + u(100)PˆB (11)
The EU of f1, f2, f3 and f4 in a state pv of both entities Ω
I
DM and Ω
II
DM is given by
Wv(f1) = 〈v|Fˆ1|v〉 = ρ2Ru(100) + ρ2Bu(0) = ρ2Ru(100) + (1− ρ2R)u(0) (12)
Wv(f2) = 〈v|Fˆ2|v〉 = ρ2Ru(100) + ρ2Bu(0) = ρ2Ru(100) + (1− ρ2R)u(0) (13)
Wv(f3) = 〈v|Fˆ3|v〉 = ρ2Ru(0) + ρ2Bu(100) = ρ2Ru(0) + (1− ρ2R)u(100) (14)
Wv(f4) = 〈v|Fˆ4|v〉 = ρ2Ru(0) + ρ2Bu(100) = ρ2Ru(0) + (1− ρ2R)u(100) (15)
respectively, where we have used (6) and (8)–(11).
Coming to the decision process, when a decision-maker is asked to compare acts f1 and f2, the com-
parison itself, before a decision is taken, defines a cognitive context, which may change the state of entities
ΩIDM and Ω
II
DM . Analogously, when a decision-maker is asked to compare acts f3 and f4, the comparison
itself, before a decision is taken, defines a new cognitive context, which may change the state of ΩIDM
and ΩIIDM . However, a comparison between f1 and f2 (and also a comparison between f3 and f4) will
have different effects on ΩIDM and Ω
II
DM . Indeed, since act f1 is ambiguous whereas f2 is unambiguous, a
comparison between f1 and f2 will determine a change of Ω
I
DM from the state pv0 to a generally different
state pv12 , whereas the same comparison will leave Ω
II
DM in the initial state pv0 . Analogously, since f3 is
ambiguous whereas f4 is unambiguous, a comparison between f3 and f4 will determine a change of Ω
I
DM
from the state pv0 to a generally different state pv34 , whereas the same comparison will leave Ω
II
DM in the
initial state pv0 .
Thus, the EUs in (13) and (15) in the state pv0 of Ω
II
DM become
Wv0(f2) = Wv0(f4) =
1
2
(
u(100) + u(0)
)
(16)
which do not depend on the conceptual state of ΩIIDM , in agreement with the fact that f2 and f4 are
unambiguous acts, while the EUs in (12) and (14) do depend on the final state of ΩIDM , again in agreement
with the fact that f1 and f3 are ambiguous acts.
Let us then prove that two ambiguity averse final states pv12 and pv34 of Ω
I
DM can be found such
that the corresponding EUs satisfy the Ellsberg preferences in Sec. 2.2, that is, Wv12(f1) < Wv0(f2) and
Wv34(f3) < Wv0(f4). Indeed, consider the states pv12 and pv34 respectively represented, in the canonical
ON basis of C2, by the unit vectors
|v12〉 = (
√
α,
√
1− α) (17)
|v34〉 = (
√
1− α,−√α) (18)
where 0 ≤ α < 12 . One preliminarily observes that the vectors |v12〉 and |v34〉 are orthogonal, that is,
〈v12|v34〉 = 0. Moreover, using (12)–(18), we get
Wv12(f1) = αu(100) + (1− α)u(0) <
1
2
(
u(100) + u(0)
)
= Wv0(f2) (19)
Wv34(f3) = (1− α)u(0) + αu(100) <
1
2
(
u(100) + u(0)
)
= Wv0(f4) (20)
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Hence, the ambiguity averse states pv12 and pv34 satisfy Ellsberg preferences in the two-urn example within
the quantum-theoretic framework. We now intend to further specify pv12 and pv34 , which will allow us to
represent the data in Sec. 2.2. This is the aim of Sec. 4.2.
4.2 Data representation in the two-urn example
To represent the data in Sec. 2.2, let us describe the decision between acts f1 and f2 as a measurement
with two outcomes that is performed on the entity ΩIDM in the state pv12 . In the canonical quantum
representation in Hilbert space, this measurement is represented by the spectral family {M,1 −M}. We
assume that the orthogonal projection operator M projects onto the 1-dimensional subspace generated by
the unit vector |m〉 = (ρmeiθm , τmeiφm), with ρm, τm ≥ 0, ρ2m + τ2m = 1, θm, φm ∈ <. Thus, the operator M
can be written as
M = |m〉〈m| =
(
ρ2m ρmτme
i(θm−φm)
ρmτme
−i(θm−φm) τ2m
)
(21)
Analogously, let us describe the decision between acts f3 and f4 as a measurement with two outcomes that
is performed on the entity ΩIDM in the state pv34 . In the canonical Hilbert space representation, this mea-
surement is represented by the spectral family {N,1−N}, where we assume that the orthogonal projection
operator N projects onto the 1-dimensional subspace generated by the unit vector |n〉 = (ρneiθn , τneiφn),
with ρn, τn ≥ 0, ρ2n + τ2n = 1, θn, φn ∈ <. Thus, the operator M can be written as
N = |n〉〈n| =
(
ρ2n ρnτne
i(θn−φn)
ρnτne
−i(θn−φn) τ2n
)
(22)
To find a mathematical representation, we have to determine the unit vectors |v12〉, |v34〉, |m〉 and |n〉
which satisfy the following conditions
〈v12|M |v12〉 = |〈m|v12〉|2 = 0.82 (23)
〈v0|M |v0〉 = |〈m|v0〉|2 = 0.50 (24)
〈m|m〉 = 1 (25)
〈v34|N |v34〉 = |〈n|v34〉|2 = 0.84 (26)
〈v0|N |v0〉 = |〈n|v0〉|2 = 0.50 (27)
〈n|n〉 = 1 (28)
The system of 6 equations must be satisfied by the parameters 0 ≤ α < 12 , ρm, τm, ρn, τn ≥ 0, θm, φm, θn, φn ∈
<. Equations (23) and (26) are determined by empirical data, (25) and (28) are determined by normaliza-
tion conditions, while (24) and (27) are determined by the fact that decision-makers who are not sensitive
to ambiguity should overall be indifferent between f1 and f2, as well as between f3 and f4. Hence, on
average, half respondents are expected to prefer f1 (f3) and the other half f2 (f4). To simplify the analysis,
let us set θm = 90
◦, θn = 270◦, φm = φn = 0. Hence, we are left with a system of 6 equations in 5 unknown
variables whose solution is 
α = 0.14815
ρm = 0.21274
τm = 0.97711
ρn = 0.99155
τn = 0.12975
(29)
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Option I Option II
Acts E1: gain E2: not gain E1: gain E2: not gain
p1 ∈ [p¯−∆, p¯+ ∆] p2 = 1− p1 p1 = p¯ p2 = 1− p¯
f1 G 0
f2 G 0
Table 2. Representation of events, payoffs and acts in the gain scenario.
Hence, the ambiguity averse states pv12 and pv34 of DM entity Ω
I
DM are respectively represented by the
unit vectors
|v12〉 = (0.38490, 0.92296) (30)
|v34〉 = (0.92296,−0.38490) (31)
which in particular determine, through the quantum probability formula (1), the subjective probability
distributions underlying the DM test in Sec. 2.2.
The orthogonal projection operators in (21) and (22) reproducing the preference rates in the same test
are instead given by
M =
(
0.04526 0.20787i
−0.20787i 0.95474
)
(32)
N =
(
0.98316 −0.12865i
0.12865i 0.01684
)
(33)
The ambiguity averse states reproduce Ellsberg preferences and represent the ambiguity aversion pat-
tern identified in the DM test on the two-urn example, which completes the construction of a quantum
mathematical representation for the data. As we can see, ambiguity aversion can be described by means of
genuine quantum structures, namely, context-dependence, superposition and intrinsically non-deterministic
state change, while quantum probabilities represent subjective probabilities.
5 A general model of hope and fear effects
We apply in this section the quantum-theoretic framework exposed in Secs. 3 and 4 to model hope effects
and fear effects in management decisions involving comparison of a risky with an ambiguous option. To
this aim, we need to convert the DM tests in Sec. 2.3 into a version of the Ellsberg two-urn example.
We split our analysis into two parts, a gain scenario (Sec. 5.1) and a loss scenario (Sec. 5.2).
5.1 Gain scenario
We consider the experimental design in Sec. 2.3 and denote by p¯ the probability that the value of the
financial parameter λ in a given investment is above a benchmark λbenchmark.
We introduce an ambiguous option I with a probability of realizing a gain G which ranges between
p¯−∆ and p¯+ ∆, and a risky option with a probability p¯ of realizing the gain G. This is equivalent to the
scenario presented in Table 2. A choice has to be made between acts f1 and f2.
The empirical pattern found in previous studies (see, e.g., [8, 9, 11]) and confirmed in [12] for high
probabilities is the following:
(i) most people will prefer f2 to f1 if p¯ is high, thus indicating ambiguity aversion and a fear effect;
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(ii) most people will prefer f1 to f2 if p¯ is low, thus indicating ambiguity seeking and a hope effect.
To reproduce (i) and (ii) in a quantum-theoretic model, we refer to the mathematical formalism in Sec.
4.1. More precisely, we introduce a DM entity ΩIDM , corresponding to the ambiguous option, whose initial
state pv0 in the absence of any context is represented by the unit vector
|v0〉 =
√
p¯|e1〉+
√
1− p¯|e2〉 = (
√
p¯,
√
1− p¯) (34)
in the canonical ON basis {|e1〉, |e2〉} of C2. This initial state will however change under interaction with
a context, e.g., the decision-maker pondering between f1 and f2, into a final state pv represented by the
unit vector
|v〉 = ρ1eiθ1 |e1〉+ ρ2eiθ2 |e2〉 = (ρ1eiθ1 , ρ2eiθ2) (35)
where ρ1 ∈ [p¯−∆, p¯+ ∆], ρ21 + ρ22 = 1, θ1, θ2 ∈ <.
Then, we introduce a DM entity ΩIIDM , corresponding to the risky option, whose initial state pv0 in the
absence of any context is again represented by the unit vector
|v0〉 =
√
p¯|e1〉+
√
1− p¯|e2〉 = (
√
p¯,
√
1− p¯) (36)
This time, however, pv0 is not supposed to change under the interaction with a context, e.g., decision-maker
pondering between f1 and f2.
Acts f1 and f2 are instead represented by the hermitian operators
Fˆ1 = u(G)|e1〉〈e1|+ u(0)|e2〉〈e2| (37)
Fˆ2 = u(G)|e1〉〈e1|+ u(0)|e2〉〈e2| (38)
respectively, where u(·) is the corresponding utility function, such that u(G) > u(0).
We now distinguish between two cases.
Case with high probability p¯. Let us construct a final ambiguity averse state pvGH of DM entity Ω
I
DM
which reproduces a fear effect, hence such that WvGH (f1) < Wv0(f2).
Firstly, the EU of act f2 in the state pv0 of Ω
II
DM is, using (4), (36) and (38),
Wv0(f2) = p¯u(G) + (1− p¯)u(0) (39)
We choose the final state of ΩIDM to be the state represented by the unit vector
|vGH〉 =
√
p¯− α|e1〉+
√
1− p¯+ α|e2〉 = (
√
p¯− α,
√
1− p¯+ α) (40)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ ∆. This vector represents an ambiguity averse state. Indeed, the EU of act f1 in the state
pvGH of Ω
I
DM is, (4), (37) and (40),
WvGH (f1) = (p¯− α)u(G) + (1− p¯+ α)u(0)
= p¯u(G) + (1− p¯)u(0)− α(u(G)− u(0)) < Wv0(f2) (41)
Hence, the conceptual state pvGH will generate a fear effect in the gain scenario with high probability p¯.
Case with low probability p¯. Let us construct a final ambiguity seeking state pvGL of DM entity Ω
I
DM
which reproduces a hope effect, hence such that WvGL(f1) > Wv0(f2).
We choose the final state of ΩIDM to be the state represented by the unit vector
|vGL〉 =
√
p¯+ α|e1〉+
√
1− p¯− α|e2〉 = (
√
p¯+ α,
√
1− p¯− α) (42)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ ∆. This vector represents an ambiguity seeking state. Indeed, the EU of act f1 in the state
pvGL of Ω
I
DM is, using (4), (37) and (42),
WvGL(f1) = (p¯+ α)u(G) + (1− p¯− α)u(0)
= p¯u(G) + (1− p¯)u(0) + α(u(G)− u(0)) > Wv0(f2) (43)
Hence, the conceptual state pvGL will generate a hope effect in the gain scenario with low probability p¯.
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Option I Option II
Acts E1: loss E2: not loss E1: loss E2: not loss
p1 ∈ [p¯−∆, p¯+ ∆] p2 = 1− p1 p1 = p¯ p2 = 1− p¯
f1 L 0
f2 L 0
Table 3. Representation of events, payoffs and acts in the loss scenario.
5.2 Loss scenario
We again consider the experimental design in Sec. 2.3 and proceed as in Sec. 5.1, with obvious changes.
We denote by p¯ the probability that the value of the financial parameter λ in a given investment is
below a benchmark λbenchmark.
We introduce an ambiguous option I with a probability of realizing a loss L which ranges between p¯−∆
and p¯+ ∆, and a risky option with a probability p¯ of realizing the loss L. This is equivalent to the scenario
presented in Table 3. A choice has been made between acts f1 and f2.
The empirical pattern found in previous studies (see, e.g., [8, 9, 11]) and confirmed in [12] for high
probabilities is the following:
(i) most people will prefer f1 to f2 if p¯ is high, thus indicating ambiguity seeking and a hope effect;
(ii) most people will prefer f2 to f1 if p¯ is low, thus indicating ambiguity aversion and a fear effect.
We again distinguish between two cases and use the symbols and procedures in Sec. 5.1. In particular,
(36)–(35) still hold and (37) and (38 hold with L in place of G and u(L) < u(0). It is then easy to prove
that the ambiguity seeking state of DM entity ΩIDM generating a hope effect in the loss scenario with high
probability p¯ is the state pvLH represented by the unit vector
|vLH〉 =
√
p¯− α|e1〉+
√
1− p¯+ α|e2〉 = (
√
p¯− α,
√
1− p¯+ α) (44)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ ∆, while the ambiguity averse state of DM entity ΩIDM generating a fear effect in the loss
scenario with low probability p¯ is the state pvLL represented by the unit vector
|vLL〉 =
√
p¯+ α|e1〉+
√
1− p¯− α|e2〉 = (
√
p¯+ α,
√
1− p¯− α) (45)
where again 0 ≤ α ≤ ∆.
We have thus provided a quantum-theoretic model of both hope and fear effects underlying individual
attitudes towards ambiguity in management decisions, like those performed in [11] and [12].
5.3 Data representation
We elaborate here a Hilbert space representation of the DM test in [12], along the lines Secs. 4.1, 5.1 and
5.2. To this end, we preliminarily note that only high probabilities of gains and losses were considered
those studies.
We start by the IRR experiment in Sec. 2.3, which has the IRR as a parameter of financial performance.
Here, we have IRRbenchmark = 15%. The authors set a probability p¯ = 0.68 and a range ∆ = 0.21 in the
gain scenario, and a probability p¯ = 0.65 and a range ∆ = 0.20 in the loss scenario. The rate of preference
of f2 over f1 was 0.62 in the gain scenario and 0.35 in the loss scenario.
Following the procedure in Sec. 4.2 and the symbols in Secs. 5.1 and 5.2, in a quantum-theoretic rep-
resentation we need to determine two final states pvGH and pvLH , respectively represented in the canonical
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ON basis of C2 by the unit vectors
|vGH〉 = (
√
0.68− α,√0.32 + α) (46)
|vLH〉 = (
√
0.65− α,√0.35 + α) (47)
0 ≤ α ≤ 0.20, and two 1-dimensional orthogonal projection operators M = |m〉〈m| and N = |n〉〈n| such
that
〈vGH |M |vGH〉 = 0.62 (48)
〈vLH |N |vLH〉 = 0.35 (49)
One can show that a solution is obtained with α = 0.05, thus
|vGH〉 = (0.79373, 0.60828) (50)
|vLH〉 = (0.77460, 0.63246) (51)
and
M =
(
0.96154 0.19231i
−0.19231i 0.03846
)
(52)
N =
(
0.93733 −0.24236
−0.24236 0.06267
)
(53)
We finally consider the ROI experiment in Sec. 2.3, where ROIbenchmark = 16%. The authors set a
probability p¯ = 0.63 and a range ∆ = 0.21 in the gain scenario, and a probability p¯ = 0.60 and a range
∆ = 0.20 in the loss scenario. The rate of preference of f2 over f1 was 0.66 in the gain scenario and 0.41
in the loss scenario.
Proceeding as above, we need to determine two final states pvGH and pvLH , respectively represented by
the unit vectors
|vGH〉 = (
√
0.63− α,√0.37 + α) (54)
|vLH〉 = (
√
0.60− α,√0.40 + α) (55)
0 ≤ α ≤ 0.20, and two 1-dimensional orthogonal projection operators M = |m〉〈m| and N = |n〉〈n| such
that
〈vGH |M |vGH〉 = 0.66 (56)
〈vLH |N |vLH〉 = 0.41 (57)
One can show that a solution is obtained again with α = 0.05, thus
|vGH〉 = (0.76158, 0.64807) (58)
|vLH〉 = (0.74162, 0.67082) (59)
and
M =
(
0.99312 0.08215
0.08215 0.00679
)
(60)
N =
(
0.12500 0.33072i
−0.33072i 0.12500
)
(61)
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This completes the construction of a quantum representation of the experimental study presented in [12]. As
we can see, the influence of psychological factors, like hopes and fears, on decision inherent investments, can
be incorporated within a quantum-theoretic framework, while aversion to ambiguity and ambiguity seeking
behaviour arise as effects due to genuine quantum structures, like context-dependence, superposition and
intrinsically non-deterministic state change. The presence of quantum structures explains the departure of
rationality, in either direction (aversion, seeking) and also the switch between a direction and another.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have put forward a theoretical framework that uses the Hilbert space formalism of
quantum theory to model the deviations from subjective EUT observed in concrete human decisions. In
this framework, ambiguity aversion and ambiguity seeking behaviour are described as effects due to genuine
quantum structures, namely, context-dependence, superposition and non-deterministic change of state. The
quantum-theoretic framework enables in this way representation of various sets of empirical data in simple
bets on urns, as well as in management decisions.
We conclude this paper with a comment that is relevant, in our opinion, to better grasp the content of
our findings.
One may object that the quantum models in Secs. 3, 4 and 5 are “ad hoc”, in the sense that they require
introduction of new parameters, which would describe empirical data, without necessarily explaining them.
In particular, one may wonder why we have chosen to use a Hilbert space over complex numbers, whereas a
Hilbert space over real numbers would have been sufficient to reproduce ambiguity seeking and ambiguity
aversion attitudes, which has already been proved (see, e.g., [32, 35]).
It is then worth emphasizing that our main aim in this paper was exactly developing a “unitary theory
of human DM”, rather than studying specific DM situations. In the investigation of specific situations
in which an interaction occurs of a decision-maker with a DM entity, we firstly look for a theory of DM,
i.e. the theoretical framework elaborated in Sec. 3, truly describing “the reality of the cognitive realm to
which a DM entity belongs” and, additionally, “how human minds can interact with the latter so that a
decision occurs”. In this sense, each time we elaborate a model for a given cognitive effect, e.g., the models
in Secs. 4 and 5, it is always our preoccupation to also make sure that: (i) the model is derived following
the logic that governs our theory of DM – in our case, quantum theory in complex Hilbert space, and (ii)
whatever other tests were to be performed by a human mind interacting with the DM entity, also the data of
these hypothetical additional tests could be modelled following our theory of DM. Clearly, the requirement
that “all possible tests and data” have to be modelled in an equivalent way poses severe constraints to
our theory, and it is not a priori evident that this would always be possible. However, we believe that
the fundamental idea underlying our methodology, namely, looking upon a decision as an interaction of a
human mind with a DM entity in a specific state, equips the theory of exactly those degrees of freedom that
are needed to model “all possible data from all possible tests”. Being “theory-based”, rather than “data-
based”, the models following from our theory of DM are not“ad hoc”, though the behavioural meaning of
the parameters appearing there is not trivial to interpret at this stage of the research.
Of course, new DM tests have to be performed to check whether the quantum-theoretic framework and
ensuing models work in general, or whether we instead need more complex Kolmogorovian or more general
non-Hilbertian structures in a unified theory of human decisions.
A The mathematics of quantum theory in Hilbert space
We present here the fundamental terminology, definitions and axioms of the formalism of quantum theory
in Hilbert space that are needed to grasp the content of this paper. More detailed introductions to the
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Hilbert space formalism for cognitive and social scientists are provided in, e.g., [14] and [17].
When the formalism of quantum theory is applied for modelling purposes, each entity that is considered
is associated with a Hilbert space H , that is, a finite-dimensional vector space over the field C of complex
numbers, equipped with a scalar product 〈·|·〉 that maps two vectors 〈u| and |v〉 onto a complex number
〈u|v〉. We denote vectors by using the “bra-ket notation” that is usual in modern manuals on quantum
theory.
Vectors can be kets, denoted by |u〉, |v〉, or bras, denoted by 〈u|, 〈v|. The scalar product between the
ket-vectors |u〉 and |v〉, or the bra-vectors 〈u| and 〈v|, is obtained by juxtaposing the bra-vector 〈u| and the
ket-vector |v〉, and 〈u|v〉 is also called a bra-ket. The scalar product 〈·|·〉 satisfies the following properties:
for every |u〉, |v〉, |w〉 ∈H and a, b ∈ C,
(i) 〈u|u〉 ≥ 0;
(ii) 〈u|v〉 = 〈v|u〉∗;
(iii) 〈u|(a|v〉+ b|w〉) = a〈u|v〉+ b〈u|w〉.
The term 〈v|u〉∗ in (ii) denotes the complex conjugate of 〈u|v〉, while the sum vector a|v〉+b|w〉 is called
the linear combination of vectors |v〉 and |w〉.
From (ii) and (iii) follows that the scalar product 〈·|·〉 is linear in the ket and anti-linear in the bra,
that is, (a〈u|+ b〈v|)|w〉 = a∗〈u|w〉+ b∗〈v|w〉.
We remind that the absolute value |z| of a complex number z ∈ C is defined as the square root of the
product between z and its complex conjugate z∗, that is, |z| = √z∗z. In addition, a complex number z can
either be decomposed into its cartesian form z = x + iy (where i is the imaginary unit, or into its polar
form z = |z|eiθ = |z|(cos θ + i sin θ). Hence, we have |〈u|v〉| = √〈u|v〉〈v|u〉. We then define the length of
a ket-(bra-)vector |u〉 (〈u|) as |||u〉|| = ||〈u||| = √〈u|u〉. A vector of unitary length is called a unit vector.
We say that two ket-vectors |u〉 and |v〉 are orthogonal, and write |u〉 ⊥ |v〉, if 〈u|v〉 = 0.
We have now introduced the necessary mathematics to state the first modelling rule of quantum theory,
as follows.
First quantum modelling rule. A state pu of an entity modelled by quantum theory is represented by a
ket-vector |u〉 with length 1, that is, 〈u|u〉 = 1.
An orthogonal projection operator Pˆ is an operator on the Hilbert space H , that is, a mapping Pˆ :H →
H , |u〉 7→ Pˆ |u〉, such that the following properties are satisfied: for every |u〉, |v〉 ∈H and a, b ∈ C,
(i) Pˆ (a|u〉+ b|v〉) = aPˆ |u〉+ bPˆ |v〉 (linearity);
(ii) 〈u|Pˆ |v〉 = 〈v|Pˆ |u〉∗ (hermiticity);
(iii) Pˆ 2 = Pˆ (idempotency).
The identity operator 1 maps each vector onto itself and is a trivial orthogonal projection operator. We
say that two orthogonal projection operators Pˆi and Pˆj are orthogonal operators if each vector contained
in the range Pˆi(H ) is orthogonal to each vector contained in the range Pˆj(H ), and we write Pˆi ⊥ Pˆj , in
this case. The orthogonality of the orthogonal projection operators Pˆi and Pˆj can also be expressed by
PˆiPˆj = 0, where 0 is the null operator. A set of orthogonal projection operators {Pˆi | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} is
called a spectral family if all Pˆis are mutually orthogonal, that is, Pˆi ⊥ Pˆj for every i 6= j, and their sum is
the identity operator, that is,
∑n
i=1 Pˆi = 1. A spectral family {Pˆi | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} identifies an Hermitian
operator Oˆ =
∑n
i=1 oiPˆi, where oi ∈ < is called an eigenvalue of Oˆ, that is, oi is a solution of the equation
Oˆ|o〉 = o|o〉 – the non-null vectors satisfying this equation are called the eigenvectors of Oˆ.
The above definitions give us the necessary mathematics to state the second and third quantum mod-
elling rules, as follows.
Second quantum modelling rule. A measurable quantity O of an entity modelled by quantum theory is rep-
resented by a spectral family {Pˆi | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} or, equivalently, by an Hermitian operator Oˆ =
∑n
i=1 oiPˆi,
where the eigenvales {o1, . . . , on} are the only possible values that can be obtained in a measurement of O.
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Third quantum modelling rule. The probability of obtaining the value oi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, in a measurement
of the quantity O, represented by the spectral family {Pˆi | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}, on an entity modelled by
quantum theory in a state pu, represented by the unit vector |u〉, is given by 〈u|Pˆi|u〉 = ||Pˆi|u〉||2. This
formula is called the Born rule in quantum theory. Moreover, if the value oi is actually obtained in the
measurement and the measurement is ideal, then the initial state pu of the entity is changed into a state
pui represented by the vector
|ui〉 = Pˆi|u〉||Pˆi|u〉||
This change of state is called reduction, or collapse, in quantum theory.
Let us now come to the formalization of quantum probability. A major structural difference between clas-
sical probability theory, which satisfies the axioms of Kolmogorov, and quantum probability theory, which
is non-Kolmogorovian, relies in the fact that the former is defined on a Boolean σ-algebra of events (see
Sec. 2.1), whilst the latter is defined on a more general algebraic structure. More specifically, let us denote
by L (H ) the set of all orthogonal projection operators over the (n-dimensional, for the sake of simplicity)
complex Hilbert space H . The set L (H ) has the algebraic properties of a complete orthocomplemented
lattice, but L (H ) is generally not distributive, hence L (H ) does not form a σ-algebra. Then, a gener-
alized probability measure over L (H ) is a mapping µ : Pˆ ∈ L (H ) 7−→ µ(Pˆ ) ∈ [0, 1], such that µ(1) = 1,
and µ(
∑n
i=1 Pˆi) =
∑n
i=1 µ(Pˆi), for any countable sequence {Pˆi ∈ L (H ) | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} of mutually
orthogonal projection operators. The elements of L (H ) are said to represent quantum events, in this
framework. Referring to the quantum modelling rules above, the event “a measurement of the quantity O
gives the value oi” is represented by the orthogonal projection operator Pˆi in quantum theory.
Born’s rule establishes a connection between states and generalized probability measures, as follows.
Given a state pu of an entity modelled by quantum theory, represented by the unit vector |u〉 ∈ H ,
it is possible to associate |u〉 with a generalized probability measure µu over L (H ), such that, for every
Pˆ ∈ L (H ), µu(Pˆ ) = 〈u|Pˆ |u〉. The generalized probability measure µu is a quantum probability measure
over L (H ).
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